S
o you want to be a whistle blower. Just gen up a strong PGP key, hide your IP address with Tails and the Tor browser (running off your USB stick), and use a secure email such as Hushmail (www.hushmail.com) or Hide My Ass (www.hidemyass.com). Make sure you're using HTTPS. Done, yes? So, why did Edward Snowden have to flee?
Not only did he know that they would find him sooner or later, but that it would be sooner with the available technology.
Too Many Vulnerabilities
There are lots of holes in technology-dependent solutions. Even an anonymizing network such as Tor is theoretically vulnerable to passive analysis. With far-reaching network access and enough computing power, the routing can be determined. The security agencies claim they can't. Go ahead and trust this if you wish. But let's look at the other vulnerabilities.
First, there are government hack attacks. A previous "Peering" column 1 mentioned the AdLeaks technology that would defeat passive detection by an agency such as the US National Security Agency (NSA). But any computer (that you know of) is subject to attack. If they can get into the machine at either end of a communication, your communications are compromised. And usually you don't really know how secure the machine on the other end is. Even if the server is really secure, they can attack the client. One feature of AdLeaks is that they won't know which client to attack. But this is still a vulnerability.
The major western security agencies claim that they haven't been able to break the main Tor protocol, but they've been successful in attacking the users' computers and even Tor servers. 2 (By the way, they make such attacks on the Tor system even though it's partially funded by the US government.) Within the US, the FBI has been successful in installing malware on some servers to learn the real IP address of users, most notably in breaking Silk Road and shutting down hundreds of Tor network nodes, but also in some other cases. They've declined to be more specific in how they accomplished this hacking.
Second, the government's job is made easier by the fact that software is eternally imperfect and there are always exploits. Anyone depending upon HTTPS was probably disappointed by the Heartbleed bug. Anyone thinking this won't ever happen again is simply ignoring the history of HTTPS bugs.
We can hear you now saying that's what someone gets for depending upon non-professional and Open Source software, though much of the Internet infrastructure does rely on such software. But major commercial operating systems are also continuously beset by security bugs (remember "goto fail"?), so much so that the only defense is to quickly fix them before they can be exploited. Peter Loscocco and his colleagues wrote an excellent paper on this topic, 3 which also demonstrates that, unsurprisingly, the NSA is on top of this. Though this paper is old, it has proven to be correct.
Other Encryption Issues
Aside from these issues, you can always rely upon the encryption delivered by the major providers, right? Unfortunately, apart from direct attacks and bugs, even if everything else was perfect, you would still be at the mercy of the NSA, because these companies cooperate in opening up their encryption. 4 We mentioned Hushmail and Hide My Ass near the beginning of this article. They're not secure against the government compelling them to turn over their keys or their users' email. Lavabit and Silent Circle shut down their email services because of this possibility. Skype is also unsafe.
It's not so much that the NSA and these providers are conspiring to control everything. Google, Microsoft, and Apple are certainly large corporations and there are large corporations who share interests with the NSA, but not necessarily these providers. But, as US companies, they have no choice. They're required by law to open up their encryption to the NSA.
They could get around this by not having access to your messages, but then that would make the service inconvenient and they want your data anyway. Their business model makes you insecure.
So, if you want to spend your money with these companies based upon promises of security, it's a free market, but you don't always get what you pay for. (And please don't think you aren't paying because the service or product is free.)
You could make yourself a complicated ring seal and buy goodquality sealing wax to convey your typewritten letters. But of course a good 3D scanner/printer would make short work of replicating the seal on your intercepted letters. 5 Back to the non-professionals. There's another choice this year: ProtonMail.
6,7 It's a browser-based mail service that keeps users' data and mail encrypted at all times, inaccessible even to them. Secret user data needed in the browser is downloaded and decrypted locally with a password that's never sent to them. Their software implements end-to-end encryption. This is probably the best you can get for secure browser-based mail. Of course, their security rests on the enforcement of the Same Origin policy in browsers, user-chosen passwords, and our good old friends, Transport Layer Security and Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL), along with a long list of X.509 trust anchors. Well, if you're still unsure what that means then you may wish to read further. 10 Being Swiss-based, they argue, means they can't be compelled by other governments, such as the US government, to help compromising users' keys or mail. We would like to believe that, but in the murky and shadowy world of intelligence service cooperation, this reassurance might not be worth as much as you would hope.
Another 
